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FOREI'ORD 
First a word about the title on the spine. I am not happy 
wit~ it but can think of no better and so have let it stand. 
I am not happy with it for fear that it excite the expectation 
that this thesis is concerned with skill only. It is not' 
it attempts a more general version of Plato's epistemology 
and of the Idea of the Good. I was not quite aware that this 
was my goal >;hen I began and the 'rays by t-rhich I reached it 
are varied and circuitous. For these reasons I cannot think 
of a title for the thesis which embraces all of its parts, 
and have to be satisfied with one for just its beginning 
and end. 
.. . . . 
PURE AND FAULTLESS SKILL 
A study in Socrates' and Plato's conception 
of skill and science in some ear~ dialogues, 
the Republic, and the Timaeus. 
by 
Roger Sword.er 
This thesis was submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the Australian National University. 
April, 1974 
I wrote this thesis 
INTRODUCTION : 
The text of this thesis is six chapters on Plato and 
an interlude on ?armenides. The six chapters are in two 
sets, the first three and the lest three, and the interlude 
divides the two sets, The first three chapters are not 
interdependent: the first does not lead to the second nor 
the first end second to the third, Instead, each of the 
first three chapters is an examination of a different aspect 
of the early dialogues, and the conclusions of each are 
brought together in the last three chapters, The first three 
chapters are like the legs of a stool, not contiguous but 
still joined together in a greater whole. The last three 
chapters on the Line, the Cave, and the Good in the Republic -
are interdependent: the conclusions of the fourth are 
employed in the fifth, and those of the fourth and fifth in the 
sixth, 
Here is an abstract of the seven parts of the thesis : 
Abstract 
Chapter I is an examination of three passages in which 
Socrates discusses skills - 'Nith Thrasymachus in the Republic 
about 'wanting more', the contrast between skill and 'empiric 
procedure' in the Gorgias, the analysis in the Laches of what 
a man must know to give good advice, I conclude that Socrates 
thinks of skill as perfected, as beyond improvement, and that 
it consists in the fullest understanding of the relations 
between some set of parts and the good which they combine to 
effect. 
Chapter II compares Socrates' method of argument 
in part of his discussion with Polemarchus and in his 
discussion with the slave in the Meno, I conclude that 
Socrates supposes the two discussions essentially similar, 
that he thinks both the slave and Polemarchus confused about 
the proper relations between the terms they employ, and that 
he believes in a single system of terms, in moral 
discourse or geometry, which is common to all but 
variously misunderstood, 
Chapter III is an analysis of the discussion about 
equal sticks and stones in the Phaedo, I argue that equal 
particulars image the Equals as Simmias' picture does 
Simmias, and that they fall short in being particulars as 
well as equal. The chapter continues by examining some 
difficulties in the theor,y of recollection, and concludes 
with a general account of the theor,y of forms. 
The Interlude on Parmenides proposes that D1 
fragments I-VIII Parmenides first illustrates then describes 
thinking and the experience by which he sees that his thinking 
is his being and all his thoughts inextricably connected and 
Dldivisible, 
Chapter IV is about noesis and dianoia on the Line of 
the Republic. I maintain that the same relations between 
images and originals hold here as in the Phaedo and that the 
lower set of intelligible entities on the Line is of visible 
diagrams, I interpret 'the unhypothesized beginning' as 
similar to Parmenidean being and noesis as seeing that the 
forms are simply intelligibles and make an indivisible whole. 
The understanding of this singla uniform structUl , of thought, 
of the proper relations between its parts and the whole, I 
take to be the descent from 'the unhypothesized beginning'. 
Chapter V is about pistis and eikasia on the Line and in 
the Cave. I propose that eikasia is the ability to predict the 
sequence of the phenomena called material objects and that 
pistis is the understanding of the natural kinds whioh 
occasion these phenomena. I continue with an examination of 
Timaeus' intelligible living creatures and conclude by showing 
how noesis, dian~, pistis, and eikasia are compatible with 
a Parmenidean conception of being. 
Chapter VI is an analysis of a central passage on the 
Idea of the Good in Republic VI, and shows how the Good, 
being, and 1the unhypothesized beginning' are identical. The 
chapter continues with an account of the Good Craftsman in the 
Timaeus and his reasons for making intelligent li;ing creatures 
of all possible kinds. I conclude with a war-stor,y. 
All references to the work of Plato and Parmenides are 
included in the text. They are taken from Burnet's edition 
of Plato's works published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1954-
1957, and from 'Parmenides' by Taran, published by the 
Princeton University Press, 1965. All other references and 
some additional remarks may be found at the back, and are 
indicated in the text by stars. The thesis concludes with a 
bibliography of works cited. 
Since the scheme of this thesis is a little unorthodox, 
it will perhaps help the reader if I show now how the 
unconnected first three chapters relate to the last three. 
The first chapter examines what Socrates thinks to be a 
satisfactory account in a skill or science such as medicine, 
and the kind of knowledge he supposes a doctor must have. I 
suggest that the Socratic requirements for a skill or science 
may be satisfied if we suppose him to believe that this kind 
of knowledge consists in the fUllest understanding of the 
relations between some set of parts and the whole which they 
combine to form. This theory, I think, underlies most of 
Socrates' epistemology, re-emerges briefly at the end of the 
second chapter, is one of two major strands in my account of 
noesis in the fourth chapter, and appears finally and most 
clearly in the sixth chapter, in my account of the Good and 
the good Craftsman. 
The second chapter is on the early dialect:~. M& 
argument here is that Socrates believes in a structure of 
thought common to himself and his respondents, though variously 
misunderstood by them. Socrates himself, I argue, is much 
better at establishing the relations between the terms of 
this structure in a consistent manner, but does not believe 
that his ability counts as true knowledge. Instead, the early 
discussion with the slave in the Meno, which illustrates that 
dialectic, is what he later calls dianoia, and this I examine 
in the fourth chapter. Hence I suppose that the method of 
the early dialectic is the first stage in the ascent to 
noesis which is the main theme of the fourth chapter. 
The third chapter is on one of the accounts of the theory 
of forms in the Phaedo, In this passage Socrates is no longer 
interested in relating a series of terms in the manner of the 
early dialectic, but instead produces a theor,y to explain 
the nature of one such term, equality, in itself and in its 
relation to equal particulars. The focus of his attention 
has significantly changed - no longer constructing the same 
kind of arguments, he now provides an unproven analogue of the 
relation between a form and a particular to help us to see 
the nature of an intelligible. Almost the same analogue 
reappears in his initial account of the Line which I examine 
in the fourth chapter. And this difference in approach to the 
terms of our thinking is the beginning of the move from 
dianoia to noesis. 
Note. I do not in this thesis discuss the Socratic 
problem but talk of Socrates and Plato as expou·.1ding a single, 
consistent, albeit developing, world-view, 
CONT1NTS 
Chapter I 
Skills and Sciences 1. 
Chapter II 
Dialectic and geometr,y 10. 
Chapter III 
Sticks and stones 28. 
Interlude 
The Way of Truth 47. 
Chapter IV 
The Line 53. 
Chapter V 
The Cave 66. 
Chapter VI 
The Good 81. 
Notes 92. 
Bibliography 1C5. 
